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Introduction
Sah (1991) likens the choice of dictatorship to that of a risky asset because some grow
very rapidly while others fail miserably. Robert Barro, in “Getting It Right,” (1996b, p.3),
expresses the similar view that dictators
“come in two types: one whose personal objectives often conflict with growth
promotion and another whose interests dictate a preoccupation with economic
development....The theory that determines which kind of dictatorship will prevail
is missing.”
We actually provide such a theory that fits into the rational choice approach to the
analysis of dictatorships initiated in Wintrobe (1990) and further developed in Wintrobe
(1998). The dictators in our model come in exactly the two types Barro proposes. One
forces a growth rate that is too high relative to the social optimum. The other type presides
over stagnation or even plunders the economy into the ground. The determination of
dictatorial type is endogenous. That is, we provide an intuitively appealing theory that
determines whether a dictatorship grows or declines and that compares its performance
with optimal behavior, finding a particularly high variability in growth rates in
dictatorships.
Political instability is a major impediment to economic growth in a wide variety of
countries (Barro 1991, Alesina, Ozler Roubini and Swagel 1996). Instability, implying risk,
limits investments and hence growth. Moreover, since physical capital is becoming
increasingly mobile across countries and regions, the role of political instability in
economic decision making is likely to increase as foreign investment and capital flight
respond ever more sensitively to changes in countries’ political environments. footnote 
While the above considerations are standard, in this paper we introduce the more novel
assumption that domestic capital development contributes to political stabilization while
domestic capital deterioration causes political destabilization. The idea underlying this
relationship is that domestic capital development increases the number and influence of
individuals with an interest in the continuance of the current political status quo, stabilizing
the system. footnote 
The dictator in our model maximizes the discounted present value of his own
consumption while he remains in office while his stochastic and endogenous survival
process is determined by political stability, which evolves over time. This notion of
dictatorship corresponds closely to the concept of “tinpot dictatorship” of Wintrobe (1990,
1998). Wintrobe’s tinpot dictator takes as much wealth as possible subject to staying in
power. We do not claim this is the only interesting kind of dictatorship. Wintrobe also
emphasizes what he calls “totalitarian dictatorships” which strive to maximize their
power. footnote However, we do believe that there are not many dictatorships that do not
display a significant tinpot element.
We contrast the dictator’s behavior with that of a social planner. There are two
differences between the two decision makers. First, the dictator suffers a penalty if he is
overthrown while the latter is indifferent to political upheavals. Second, the dictator’s
behavior is driven by the fraction of output he skims off, while in the socially planned
economy nothing is skimmed off and the planner is concerned with overall
consumption. footnote 
Our first result is that in dictatorships there are only three possible qualitative paths for
domestic capital: steady growth, steady decline, or zero growth, a knife-edge
case. footnote In particular, a “U-shape” scenario under which domestic capital first
deteriorates and then reverses course cannot occur. There is a straightforward intuition
underlying this result. Domestic capital deterioration decreases stability, worsening the
conditions for domestic capital investment, leading to further deterioration, completing a
vicious cycle. Under these conditions the dictator aggressively plunders the country’s
resources, even while realizing that in doing so he hastens his departure from power and,
hence, his ability to continue extracting wealth. The key insight here is that in an unstable
environment the dictator expects to remain in power for only a short period, regardless of
his strategy, so plundering dominates investment.
On the other hand, there is a self-reinforcing cycle underlying steady growth that has
mirror-image intuition: domestic capital growth increases stability, improving the
conditions for increased domestic capital investment leading to further growth, completing
a virtuous circle. In this case, the dictator is restrained in his wealth extraction to lengthen
the time he will enjoy the benefits of continued power. In particular, more investment leads
to more stability, extending the dictator’s effective time horizon. Note that a dictator with a
below-bifurcation capital stock does have the option of pursuing rapid, and stabilizing,
growth. It is just not optimal to do so because he would already be ousted with high
probability before he could reach a region of reasonably high stability.
A central and related result is that if the economy begins with sufficient domestic
capital to promote political stability there is steady growth; otherwise, there is steady
deterioration. In other words, there is a critical level of domestic capital which we will refer
to as a “bifurcation point”: an economy below this level finds itself in a development trap
whereas one above the threshold follows a plan of steady growth. footnote 
We analyze how the bifurcation point depends on the underlying parameters. It is
decreasing in the dictator’s discount factor and the ex ante probability of remaining in
office. These results make sense; a more patient or stable dictator should be more willing to
pursue growth than a less patient or stable one. footnote The bifurcation point is also
decreasing in the depreciation rate, i.e., faster depreciation presents an increased threat to
political stability that our dictators address directly through an enhanced tendency to grow.
Increasing the penalty to the dictator for losing power also decreases the bifurcation point;
since growth stabilizes the dictator’s position a strong fear of losing power is a positive
factor for growth. Another way to view the same result is that dictators who are skimming
a large fraction of their economy’s consumption are more willing to grow than those who
are skimming less because the former have more to lose from leaving office than the latter.
This fits well with the theory of dictatorships developed in McGuire and Olson (1996) and
particularly Olson (2000), according to which a dictator with a more “encompassing”
interest, i.e., one who is taking a larger fraction, will be more willing to promote growth
than one with a less encompassing interest. This point is not obvious because dictators who
are skimming a large fraction of total consumption might be expected to set high
consumption levels, hindering growth. However, it turns out that this effect is dominated
by the desire to survive as long as possible in power.
The shape of the policy function, giving the fraction of output consumed as a function
of domestic capital, is of interest. The consumption fraction follows two possible paths. On
the first it starts high, eventually falls and then once again increases. On the other path it
falls even at low values of capital and then rises. This indicates that at an early stage of
development dictatorships increase their saving rates as they grow richer. This result
provides insight into the rapid growth experience of the Asian Tiger economies that did
indeed have declining consumption rates during their takeoff phases (World Bank 1993.
pp. 40-42).
We explore the differences between the dictator’s and social planner’s behavior. The
most glaring distinction is that the social planner does not exhibit bifurcation. In fact, for
the parameters we consider the social planner always grows. footnote Next, for sufficiently
high domestic capital dictatorships grow faster than their corresponding social planner
economies. The intuition is that a dictator expects high growth rates to prolong his tenure
in power. Thus, when a dictator chooses growth, he will eventually choose rapid growth in
order to increase the longevity of his rule. footnote On the other hand, dictatorships below
the bifurcation point shrink when, with the same endowment, social planners grow. This
reveals a tendency for dictators to plunder their countries’ wealth when their hold on power
is insecure. We also find that the variability of growth rates for our dictators is higher than
for our social planners.
These results have interesting connections with some common ideas on growth and
dictatorship. First, one often encounters the view that corrupt regimes have a strong
tendency to decline. footnote But, within our framework this is not necessarily the case.
Below the bifurcation point our regimes, which are by nature corrupt in the sense that they
appropriate national wealth for themselves, do indeed decline rapidly. But sufficiently
above bifurcation they grow very rapidly. This is not to say that our results would support a
view that dictatorships are socially optimal. In fact, our model dictatorships do not choose
socially optimal growth rates, but they may experience excessively rapid growth. A second
common view is that insecure dictators will tend to plunder their economies into decline
(e.g. Olson, 1991, 1993). Again, this is true only below bifurcation in our model. It is true
that instability leads to what we call a “horizon-shortening effect” that operates against
growth in all cases. But at the same time there is also an “endogenous-survival effect” that
works in the opposite direction. Since rapid investment shifts to the right the probability
distribution over the dictator’s time in power, there is a tendency for overinvestment by
moderately insecure dictators. In other words, a desire to stabilize his position might lead a
dictator to favor rapid growth.
Robinson (1997) studies exactly the same question as we do, namely when does a state
promote development and when does it simply prey off the population? The key tradeoff in
this work is that development expands the pie from which a state can siphon off resources
but also can make it easier for opposition to organize against the state. A good example of
the issue is building roads; roads are good for development but also can be used for
subversive activity. Interestingly, in this theory patient dictators can be among the least
development-oriented because they are the most averse to the possible future political
destabilization that public investment could cause. We believe this work gives very
important insights, particularly into the large number of corrupt regimes that have
stagnated and deteriorated over time. However, we also think that many important cases fit
into our complementary approach that treats growth as stabilizing rather than destabilizing.
In fact, many Asian regimes in particular seem to derive their legitimacy mainly from their
ability to deliver economic growth (Campos and Root 1996,World Bank, 1993). footnote 
We will return to Robinson (1997) several times below.
Wintrobe (1990, 1998) provides a general theory of dictatorships of all possible types.
The main concern in this work is how dictators maintain power through the use of
repression, economic growth and distribution of rents. Wintrobe also considers how
economic growth affects the dictator’s optimal use of repression.. Although we do not
consider repression here, our idea of stabilization through growth, underpinned by the
enhanced opportunities for co-optation of potential opposition that growth affords, are very
much along the lines of Wintrobe’s thinking. However, Wintrobe’s analysis does not delve
into the mechanics of the growth process and, therefore, is unable to do, e.g., the sorts of
comparisons between the growth rates of dictatorships and social planners that feature
centrally in our work.
Marcouiller and Young (1995) provide an interesting static model of a predatory state
showing how, through general equilibrium effects, the threat that economic activity will
withdraw into the informal economy to avoid corrupt taxation can be very weak. They give
circumstances under which it can be rational for a dictator to tax the formal sector very
heavily while simultaneously providing virtually no public goods. This work is, however,
concerned solely with negative outcomes and also does not study dynamics.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section two we present the model. We give the
main results and analysis in section three. Section four contains comparative statics,
interpretations and policy considerations. We conclude in section four.
The Model
Production
The economy’s production function is
Ft  KtJt1   #   
where Kt is domestic and non-mobile capital and Jt is foreign and fully-mobile capital at
time t respectively and where t  1,2, ... is measured in discrete intervals. We think in
terms of a broad concept of domestic capital that goes beyond traditional physical capital to
include physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, telephone lines etc.), market infrastructure
(stock, bond, and derivatives markets, banks, a functioning legal system etc.), and human
capital. Foreign capital is complementary to domestic capital and includes such factors as
advanced technology, sophisticated physical capital and modern managerial skills – factors
of production not readily available in the domestic economy.
Foreign Investment
We assume a small open economy, i.e., foreign investment flows into or out of the
country until its domestic return is equal to a fixed world rate of return, . footnote 
Therefore   FtJt  1  JtKt. Solving for Jt yields
Jt  1  
1
Kt   #   
The Rate of Return on Domestic Capital
Domestic capital earns its marginal product, so that its rate of return wt is
wt  FtKt  Jt
1Kt1   1  1  
1   #   
Since it turns out that wt does not vary over time, we define w  wt so as not to
unnecessarily carry the t subscript through all the calculations. Gross domestic earnings are
wKt and are decreasing in the world rate of return. Note that the production function is
homogeneous of degree one so, using Euler’s theorem, Ft  KtJt1  wKt  Jt.
Domestic Capital Development
Let Ct denote consumption and define investment as It where It  wKt  Ct. The
difference equation governing domestic capital evolution is
Kt1  1  Kt  It,   #   
where 0    1 is the rate of decay of capital. This formulation builds some persistence
into the domestic capital stock while requiring investment if the stock is to be maintained
or increased.
Political Catastrophes
A key feature in the model is that in every period there is an endogenous probability of
a political catastrophe that removes the dictator from power. Conceptually, we consider
that overthrow is likely when the government fails to satisfy certain active power groups,
which must be paid off or kept happy through targeted investments. The money to pay
these interests may come from taxes which are a fraction of output wKt, or it may come
from more militant appropriation of capital; in either case the availability of funds is
proportionate to Kt. The probability of a catastrophe in period t, given that one has not yet
occurred, is modeled accordingly as
qt  qKt  min eKt , 1   #   
where   0. footnote This is the probability that the dictator is not in power during year
t  1 given that he was in power during year t. Thus, the transition out of power occurs at
the end of year t. In the computations  is chosen so that   Kt  0 for all plausible
values of Kt. With greater domestic capital, equation (2.5) then implies that the dictator is
able to satiate the demands of a greater number of participants in the active power groups.
By increasing their satisfaction with the status quo, the dictator reduces the chance of being
overthrown through political revolution. footnote 
To elucidate the meaning of political catastrophe, we offer the following examples. The
key issue is whether or not the overthrow of a dictator leads to a substantial cut in an elite’s
ability to extract resources from the economy. Communist revolutions would always
qualify as political catastrophes, because they curtail the ability of the overthrown elite to
enjoy the benefits of power. Some coups bring about real turnover in elites and would,
therefore, qualify as political catastrophes. Other coups amount to a reshuffling of titles
and would not be political catastrophes in our terms. The sudden democratization of
Eastern Europe probably would be a political catastrophe, although many would argue that
their was much less elite turnover than is commonly supposed.
Objective of the Policymaker
We are interested in the behavior of a dictatorship concerned with the portion of
domestic consumption it takes in every period up until a catastrophe point – if one occurs.
The dictator chooses the split of output between consumption and investment, but not his
level of consumption relative to the average citizen’s consumption. Consumption for the
dictator is Ct where 0    1. The dictator’s utility in period t is
Ut 
Ct 1
1 if   1 and in power
lnCt if   1 and in power
Umin if not in power
  #   
where   0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The last line reflects the key fact
that the dictator is penalized for losing power. Umin and  are taken as parameters that are
varied in the computations to reflect different penalties for losing power. Umin in the
computation is chosen so that for any reasonable capital stock utility in power is higher
than utility out of power.
Assuming a discount factor of 0    1 and subject to equations 2.1  2.6, the
dictator’s problem can be written as
Ctt1
max E
t1

tUt  
1
1   Umin   #   
where  is a random variable with range 1,2, ... giving the stochastic and endogenous
time when the catastrophe occurs. An equivalent formulation for the problem is
Ctt1
max E
t1

t 
1
t
1  qK UCt  1 
1
t
1  qK Umin   #   
where
1
t
1  qK is the endogenous probability that the dictator is in power at time t
and 1  
1
t
1  qK is the endogenous probability that the dictator is not in power at
time t. These products are built up inductively using the law of conditional probability, i.e.,
if
1
t1
1  qK is the probability that the dictator survives until period t  1 then we
multiply this probability by 1  qKt, namely the probability of surviving until period t
given survival until period t  1, to obtain the probability of survival until period t.
Next, as a basis for comparison, we consider the problem of a benevolent social
planner. This problem coincides with the dictator’s problem, but with one key difference;
the social planner does not view political catastrophe as terminating high utility. The
difference between the criteria of the social planner and the dictator is that the dictator
weighs a given future period’s utility by the probability of avoiding catastrophe up to that
point, while the social planner takes into account the path of the economy after catastrophe.
After a political upheaval, the economy continues on with different leadership but still
provides utility to the population. The planner’s problem is thus given by
Ctt0
max E
t1

tUCt   #   
where UCt 
Ct 1
1 if   1
lnCt if   1
.
One way to understand the difference between (2.7) and (2.9) is that the sum in the
former runs from 0 to the random  (with utility Umin thereafter) while the latter runs with
certainty to . Equation (2.8) seems to suggest that the possibility of political catastrophe,
and hence the termination of the dictator’s reign, acts simply to intensify time discounting.
Although there is some truth in this it misses the most crucial point about the model; the
dictator’s survival probability is endogenously determined. Thus, our formulation allows
the dictator, in effect, control over discounting: a factor that is the key to our analysis.
Dynamic Programming Formulation
Let VdK denote the value to the dictator of a domestic capital stock of K. The
Bellman equation for the dictator’s problem is
VdK 
0CwK
max UC  1  qKVd1  K  I  qKVmin   #   
Equation (2.10) just says that the value Vd to a dictator of a given level of domestic capital,
having avoided catastrophe this period, is the utility of consumption plus the value of the
resultant domestic capital next period discounted by  and the probability of avoiding
catastrophe plus the value of losing power times its probability also discounted by . It is
well known that this formulation is equivalent to (2.7).
Similarly, let VpK denote the value to the planner of a domestic capital stock of K.
The Bellman equation for the social planner is
VpK 
0CwK
max UC  Vp1  K  I.   #   
Capital and Political Stability
Consider our working hypothesis that more domestic capital causes greater stability.
Might it not be more sensible to posit that public pressure punishes a dictator for deviating
too far from the behavior of a social planner rather than for not building a large enough
capital stock? It might be sensible for a homogenous public to establish a survival
probability for a dictator that decreases in the distance of economic policy from optimality.
However, consider the following micro underpinning for our hypothesis. At the beginning
there are two groups, an elite group (the dictator’s people) and a non-elite group (people
who would like to overthrow the dictator). Imagine the probability of overthrow is an
increasing function of the size of the non-elite group. Now suppose the elite co-opts, e.g.,
by transferring some wealth, some members of the non-elite into joining a third group that
is politically neutralized, i.e., that does not actively oppose the dictator. It is intuitively
plausible that the wealthier is the elite the larger will be the fraction of the non-elite the
former is able to co-opt. That is, a larger capital stock at the disposal of the elite will allow
it to buy more political stability. footnote 
The correspondence between a given country’s political stability and its present capital
stock is a key premise of our paper so we consider here some pertinent empirical evidence.
Londregan and Poole (1990) did extensive empirical work on coups. One of their main
conclusions is that the probability of coups is indeed decreasing in income. As noted in
section 2.5 coups and political catastrophes are not synonymous.. Nevertheless, there is
surely sufficient overlap to make Londregan and Poole’s result relevant, especially
considering that they obtained a very strong result. Londregan and Poole also show that
economic growth reduces the probability of coups. Przeworski et. al. (1996) and
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) reinforce the point by showing that growing dictatorships
are much less likely to democratize than shrinking ones, i.e., on average growth tends to be
stabilizing for dictatorships in a different dimension. Again, political catastrophe and
democracy are not identical but overlap significantly.
Results
The Basic Approach
The problem is too complicated to yield an analytical solution so we solve it
numerically. footnote Table one gives the parameter values included in the computations.
Our goal was to be as realistic as possible. For standard parameters we used typical values
from the growth literature. In fact, everything is entirely standard except for the parameters
of the catastrophe function, which does not have any close counterpart in any established
literature we know of. For this reason we ranged over a large number of parameters for the
catastrophe function. There are a total of 432 parameter sets. We give details of the
computational procedure in the appendix. Table 1 gives the computational grid.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Dependence on Initial Domestic Capital – Bifurcation
In 429 out of the 432 cases there is a bifurcation point for domestic capital in the
solution to the dictator’s problem. That is, in these cases if initial domestic capital begins
above some level

K, then it will always increase, but if domestic capital begins below

K it
will always decrease. The remaining 3 cases involve growth even for very low values of K.
As figure 1 shows, most of the bifurcation points are in the range between $1 billion and
$10 billion. The values of K shown range from $.1 billion to $1 trillion, and the horizontal
axis is logarithmic, with each interval indicating a multiple of ten in K. The plot is very
slightly smoothed (otherwise it would consist of spikes) using kernel density methods, with
201 points and a kernel half-width of 0.025, ensuring that the fine structure of the
distribution remains apparent. footnote 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The main reason for this behavior is captured by the following mechanism. If initial
domestic capital is low the dictator has a low probability of retaining power for very long.
Thus, it is pointless to invest and, therefore, he allows the capital stock to deteriorate while
he plunders the economy. This is consistent with the idea that insecure dictators do not
favor growth (Olson, 1991, 1993). On the other hand, if initial domestic capital is relatively
high the dictator can look forward to a long reign in power and therefore will wish to
invest, further delaying his expected departure date. In this case, the dictator’s strategy is to
restrain his plundering in exchange for increasing his time in power. Thus, moderate
insecurity is consistent with economic growth. Clague et. al. (1996) show empirically that
dictators who are in power for a long time are more restrained in their plundering, in the
sense that they give more respect to property and contract rights, than those who are in
power for a short period of time. This is consistent with our result if one posits that on
average dictators who lasted a long time expected to last a long time and those who lost
power quickly did not expect to hold power very long.
The following proposition further develops the bifurcation intuition.
Proposition Suppose the dictator’s value function, VdK in equation 2.10, is strictly concave
and differentiable. Then if the capital stock in period t  1 is (weakly) larger than
the capital stock in period t, the capital stock in any period   t will always be
(weakly) larger than the capital stock in period   1. Conversely, if the capital
stock in period t  1 is (weakly) smaller than the capital stock in period t, the capital
stock in any period   t will always be (weakly) smaller than the capital stock in
period   1.
 [Proof] Suppose Kt1  Kt but, contrary to the proposition, Kt2  Kt1. This would
imply that Ct1  Ct. Note that the solution to the maximization problem on the RHS of the
Bellman equation (2.10) must be an interior solution. Consider the first order conditions for
this solution at both time t and time t  1. They are
UCt  1  qKt dV
dKt1
dK  0   #   
and
UCt1  1  qKt1 dV
dKt2
dK  0   #   
But UCt  UCt1, 1  qKt  1  qKt1 and dVdKt1 dK  dV
dKt2 
dK which leads to a
contradiction. Therefore if the capital stock ever increases it can never again decrease.
The proof of the claim that once capital shrinks it continues to shrink is a mirror image
of the above argument. [End Proof] 
The computations indicate that the dictator’s value function is strictly concave only for
50 of the 432 parameter sets tested so the proposition is of limited applicability. On the
other hand, the computed value functions are nearly always concave at sufficiently low and
high values of K (all but about 25 are strictly concave near K$.1 billion and all are strictly
concave near K$1 trillion) so the proposition does provide insight for all of the
cases. footnote 
The Dictator’s Policy Function
It is interesting to note the non-monotonicity of the consumption fraction as a function
of domestic capital (hence income). In most of the cases the consumption fraction starts
high, then falls, and then rises again. In the rest it decreases even at low K and then rises.
The reason for this behavior is closely connected with the above discussion of bifurcation.
If domestic capital is below the bifurcation point, then the optimal choice is to allow it to
deteriorate. This implies that an increase in domestic capital that does not push the
economy above the bifurcation point simply leads to higher current consumption. When the
bifurcation point is crossed, however, the basic plan shifts from plundering the economy
and extinguishing domestic capital to building it up. There is then an interval of higher
domestic capital levels over which improved conditions for investing in domestic capital
induce the policymaker to cut the consumption rate. The bifurcation point for an economy
generally occurs near the beginning of this interval of declining consumption. At even
higher levels of domestic capital, the consumption fraction once again begins to increase.
This is consistent with the experience of Asian tigers who increased their saving rates at
early stages of industrialization (World Bank 1993. pp. 40-42).
The Dictator Versus the Social Planner
The crucial difference between the planner and the dictator is that the planner does not
exhibit bifurcation. In fact, for all the parameter values we used the social planner chooses
positive growth for any initial domestic capital stock. So whenever our model dictatorships
shrink it is always socially sub-optimal to do so.
Next, when the dictatorial economy has an initial domestic capital level sufficiently
above its bifurcation point, it achieves a higher growth rate than the comparable
socially-planned economy, i.e., it grows faster than is socially optimal. The intuition behind
this result is that the dictator, but not the social planner, cares about the probability of
survival. This endogenous probability is increased by heavy investment in domestic capital
(equation 2.5). Thus, the dictator has a unique incentive to push for a high growth rate.
It is, perhaps, surprising that there are any circumstances at all under which the dictator
outgrows the social planner. The dictator, in effect, discounts the future more than the
planner because the former’s planning horizon is truncated (stochastically) by the
possibility that he will be removed from power. How is it that the one who discounts the
future most strongly invests the most? The dictator can affect his survival prospects
through his investment strategy: more investment leads to a longer expected term in office.
Thus, the endogeneity of the political catastrophe is the reason for high
investment. footnote 
These considerations can be clearly displayed in the following manner. First, using
2.11, a solution to the dictator’s problem starting from an initial capital stock K, Ctdt1

must have the property that C1d solves
0CwK
max UC1  qK
UC2d  1  qK2CVdK3C  qK2CUmin
qKUmin   #   
where K2C  1  K  wK  C and
K3C  1  1  K  wK  C  w1  K  wK  C  C2d. This problem can be
interpreted as choosing consumption in period 1 subject to the constraints that the
decision-maker will consume C2d, the quantity the (optimizing) dictator would consume in
period 2, and then receive the continuation utility associated with the capital stock implied
by his choice in period 1 and C2d. A solution to the planner’s problem starting from an
initial capital stock K, Ctpt1 , must have the property that C1p solves
0CwK
max UC  UC2p  VPK3C   #   
This problem can be interpreted as choosing consumption in period 1 subject to the
constraints that the decision-maker will consume C2
p, i.e., the quantity the (optimizing)
social planner would consume, in period 2 and then receive the continuation utility
associated with the capital stock implied by his choice in period 1 and C2
p. These problems
yield, for the dictator and social planner respectively, the first order conditions
0  UC  21  qKqK2CVdK3C  Umin
 21  qK1  qK2C V
dK3C
K3 K3
 C
  #   
and
0  UC  2 V
PK3C
K3 K3
 C   #   
It is clear, from comparing the third term in 3.5 with the second term in 3.6, that for the
dictator the marginal value of more capital next period is discounted by the extra
1  qK1  qK2C relative to the planner. This “horizon-shortening effect” argues
for less investment. On the other hand, the dictator’s term
21  qKqK2CVK3C  Umin  0 in 3.5 reflects an “endogenous-survival
effect” that argues for more investment. It turns out that the latter effect dominates the
former far enough above bifurcation.
The present result can be further understood by comparing typical dictators’ and
planners’ policy functions as shown in figure 2. The figure compares the two optimal
functions using identical parameter values. Above bifurcation consumption in the
dictatorial economy falls to a level below that in the planner’s economy, leading to faster
growth. For high levels of domestic capital, policies of the dictator and social planner
converge because instability is extremely low (equations 2.10 and 2.11 demonstrate this
mathematically). Indeed, when the threat of political overthrow is tiny, the dictator and
social planner become indistinguishable.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3 gives a picture of the distribution of capital stocks at which the dictator’s
consumption dips below that of the social planner ranging over all the parameter values we
studied. Note that the capital stocks required for the dictator to outgrow the planner are not
especially high; all of these “cut-through points” are below $100 billion and 74% of them
are below $10 billion. We also studied the response of cut-through points to changes in
underlying parameters and got exactly the same qualitative results as we had for the
response of bifurcation points to parameter changes.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The magnitude of cut-through is quite significant. An average of 1.4 orders of
magnitude (686.8 grid points) within the range K  $.1 billion to $1 trillion involved the
dictator’s consumption strictly less than the social planner’s. The various parameter sets
ranged from 0.69 to 2.88 orders of magnitude (343 to 1441 grid points) in which the
dictator’s consumption was lower over that range. Among the values of K for which the
dictator’s C was lower, the dictator on average chose 26.1% less consumption than the
social planner (with the mean percentage below ranging from 2.8% to 52.3% for alternative
parameter sets). Again, among the values of K for which the dictator’s C was lower, the
dictator on average had a growth rate higher by 0.0044 (0.44% per annum) than the social
planner (with the amount higher ranging from 0.000017 to 0.0174 for alternative parameter
sets). The differences in growth rates were much more pronounced than these averages at
values of K shortly after the cut-through.
Comparative Statics, Interpretation and Policy
Comparative Statics
The computations yield the following unambiguous results on how the bifurcation
point, when it exists, responds to changes in underlying parameters. The bifurcation point
is decreasing in ,  and . The first is the unsurprising result that patient dictators are
more development-oriented than impatient ones. An interpretation of the second result is
that the more lucrative it is to run the country the more interested the dictator will be in
growth because growth stabilizes his position and creates a larger pie to steal from. The
third indicates that rapidly depreciating capital sufficiently threatens political stability to
produce a strong growth inclination. The bifurcation point is increasing in Umin, i.e.,
dictators expecting a soft landing after losing power are less interested in growth than those
who expect to suffer more when out of power. This is because growth is stabilizing so the
more determined is a dictator to hold power the more inclined he is to foster
growth. footnote The bifurcation point is increasing in political instability (as measured by
q1 $10 billion , see table 1) is bad for growth. The bifurcation point does not respond
systematically to changes in  or to changes in  and  that hold q1 fixed.
The effect of changing q1 may be of special interest if we consider that different
countries may have different q1’s due to exogenous factors. For example, one might argue
that Taiwan and South Korea in the 1950s were able to achieve higher political stability at
a similar level of development than was the Philippines, due to higher equality resulting
from land reform. The differences in q1’s might have put these countries on different sides
of their respective bifurcation points, at least for some time periods, resulting in the large
differences in per capita GDPs they have achieved today.
It is important to note that the model does not simply predict that poor countries always
decline and rich countries always grow. Of course, for any fixed set of parameters there is
bifurcation, but the location of the critical point depends on all the parameters. So, for
example, Argentina may be richer than Taiwan at a particular point in time but Taiwan
might grow and Argentina might shrink if Taiwan can find a source of intrinsic political
stability that Argentina cannot.
Another grand comparative static is to compare the variation in growth rates across
regime types. The result is that our model dictatorships display much more variability in
growth rates than do the model social planner economies. In particular, the standard
deviation of growth rates, ranging over all parameter values and a sampling of 2001
logarithmically equally spaced initial Ks, (ranging from $.1 billion to $1 trillion) is 13.1 for
the dictator and 7.4 for the social planner. The high variability for the dictator is due to
strong policy response to varying K rather than to response to changing parameter values.
This result ties in with the empirical results of Almeida and Ferreira (2002) who show that
the variability of economic performance in dictatorships is higher than that in democracies.
Of course, our results are not directly comparable with theirs because we compare
dictatorships to social planner economies and they compare dictatorships with
democracies. However, if one accepts the notion that democratic pressure prevents
governments departing extremely far for optimality then democracies will behave
somewhat like social planner economies and there is a basis for comparison between our
paper and Almeida and Ferreira’s.
Interpretation
With our results in hand we now briefly consider a number of development cases. We
organize this discussion around a comparison with Robinson (1997), the other serious
attempt to address the determinants of whether a state is predatory or developmental. We
think the discussion makes clear that both models have significant relative strengths.
We first compare and contrast the two theories. They agree that low initial income and
high intrinsic instability are risk factors for predation. The theories diverge on the effects of
time horizons and on the consequences of the degree to which the elite skims off
resources. footnote In Robinson (1997) a more patient and/or more encompassing elite is
less likely to be developmental than its less patient and/or less encompassing cousins. We
have the opposite result on both counts. Our prediction of suboptimally fast growth in
developmental dictatorships differs from Robinson (1997) where developmental states
always behave optimally. Finally, Robinson (1997) alone has a role for natural resource
wealth as a risk factor for predation. In the following discussion we focus on time horizons
and the degree to which dictators are encompassing. Note, however, that below we will
never consider intrinsic patience as a preference. Rather we consider time horizon only as it
relates to survival prospects.
The Robinson (1997) story seems quite persuasive for the famous plundering dictators
such as Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, the Somoza’s in Nicaragua, the Duvalier’s in
Haiti and Mobutu in Zaire. footnote Long-lived plundering dictators are problematic for
our theory because in our framework dictator-predators should begin with a relatively high
probability of losing power and this probably should steadily increase the more they
plunder. Therefore, long-lived predators must be lucky to retain power as long as they do.
Of course, low probability events do occur and it may be that some of the above dictators
always assumed that they might lose power at any moment. Nevertheless, it is reasonable
to posit that most long-lasting dictatorships had good chances ex ante of lasting for a long
time.
On the other hand, many countries experience long sequences of plundering dictators,
frequent coups and economic deterioration, a pattern that fits our theory well. An excellent
example is Uganda after independence that had seven changes of government between
1979 and 1986 alone and many further changes outside this period (Rake 2003). Ghana
1960-90 and Argentina 1946-1982 also fit the profile of decline, corruption and coups
(McCaskie 2003, Skidmore and Smith 1997, ch. 3). Within the Robinson (1997)
framework one would have to argue that the dictators in these countries had reasonable
survival prospects which they further enhanced by letting their countries’ infrastructure
decline. However, the reality of frequent power changes suggests that these rulers would
have perceived themselves to have low survival chances. Moreover, if infrastructure
deterioration did contribute to political stability the effect was probably small given the
large number of coups we observe ex post. In contrast, our framework of economic
deterioration linked with low and declining survival prospects for dictators seems a natural
way of viewing these cases.
Also, congenial to our framework are rapid-growing-long-lived dictatorships. Prime
examples are the Asian miracle economies, particularly Suharto’s Indonesia (Temple 2003)
and Mahathir’s Malaysia (Gomez and Jomo 1999). footnote These are highly
encompassing regimes with very long lives that effectively distributed the fruits of rapid
growth to consolidate their political power. More generally, Campos and Root (1996, p. 3),
building on World Bank (1993) write of the Asian miracle economies: “Broadly similar
historical circumstances led each regime to pursue shared growth as a strategy for
legitimating its rule.” Our theory predicts not just rapid growth for developmental
dictatorships but suboptimally fast growth. It is difficult to find direct evidence on this
score but it is nevertheless worth mentioning the papers of Young (1995) and Lau and Kim
(1994) arguing that Asian growth has been based primarily on the relentless accumulation
of factors of production rather than on total factor productivity growth. In other words, the
growth has been fast but costly, perhaps too costly. footnote Another important example of
rapid growth at extremely high cost is the Soviet Union under Stalin where the
industrialization speed was surely forced well beyond any conceivably optimal speed with
the goal of reducing the threat that communism would be overthrown by the capitalist or
fascist powers. footnote This case is another variation on the theme of growth bringing
political stability.
Thailand since 1965 strikes us as a good example of a Robinson-type developmental
dictatorship since it has combined frequent coups with rapid growth (Campos and Root
1996, pp. 7-10). The Thai dictatorships also do not appear to be nearly as encompassing as
were the likes of Mobutu and Trujillo. Therefore, one might usefully think of these
dictators as willing to undertake some politically destabilizing infrastructure development
as part of a short-term attempt to expand the base from which they could profit. In our
framework, in contrast, we would have to argue that Thai dictators continuously stabilized
their political environment through investment but were plagued by bad luck, experiencing
many improbable coups.
Policy
Choices made by dictatorships facing instability will often vary from choices predicted
by standard growth models involving benevolent social planners. Good policy analysis
should acknowledge the realities of dictatorships. Failure to do so may contribute to the
mixed success of foreign aid programs. footnote 
As one step toward explicit thinking about dictatorships, our paper provides a novel
perspective on how dictatorships may respond to aid. In our framework decreasing
resource skimming (lowering ) actually yields lower growth, while decreasing a dictator’s
anticipated out-of-power utility, Umin, is good for growth. These results are due to the fact
that the larger is the difference between a dictator’s in-power and out-of-power utility, the
greater is his determination to retain power and hence to encourage economic growth. This
logic suggests that if the international community wishes to increase growth rates in
dictatorships then it should focus effort on reducing the comfort of dictators who have lost
power, for example by freezing bank accounts and by prosecuting human rights violations.
Thus, General Pinochet’s recent experience in London may be good for growth in the
developing world while reducing the corruption of those who hold power might get the
opposite result.
A second point revolves around our bifurcation result. Giving moderate aid packages to
unstable dictatorships will not cause a take-off of growth. Rather, it will just delay the
downward spiral of consumption and predation. This conclusion would be modified if a
foreign donor could contribute in a special way so as to enhance political stability enough
for the economy to reach the other side of the bifurcation. Of course, all this policy analysis
would be reversed if the international community prefers not to help dictatorships to grow.
Conclusion
We believe that our assumption about the relationship between the capital stock and
political stability has good empirical grounding and has led us to many interesting results.
Yet, it cannot be considered an iron law of nature. In certain situations rapid growth may
be destabilizing (Olson 1963). Indeed, as we have seen Robinson (1997) produces many
valuable insights working essentially off the opposite premise. We believe it may be
possible to reconcile the two approaches by distinguishing carefully between different
types of investments in an environments where an elite group tends naturally to support the
dictator while a non-elite group tends to oppose him. Investment that strengthens the elite
is stabilizing while investment that strengthens the non-elite is destabilizing. Thus,
stabilizing investments could include construction contracts for big office buildings or the
development of a port to aid the shipping industry. Such business can feed politically
connected constituencies while creating infrastructure with minimum potential to enhance
the organizing opportunities of the non-elite. Also, if a particular investment enhances the
government tax base or creates wealth that the government can simply expropriate, then the
government should be able to strategically reallocate the proceeds so as to strengthen its
position. On the other hand, some investments such as basic health and education
investment probably will strengthen the non-elite relative to the elite and be destabilizing
for the government. Some big infrastructure projects such as roadbuilding and
telecommunications, although wealth-enhancing for the elite, may still on balance be
dangerous to the dictator because of the opportunities for anti-government organization
they offer.
Of course, if one acknowledges that there are both stabilizing and destabilizing
investments then a key issue for a dictator would be whether he can find lots of stabilizing
ones while largely avoiding the destabilizing ones. We suggest, however, that depending
on specific circumstances this may or may not be possible. Thus, some dictators might
perceive no way forward without destabilizing themselves while others might see their
salvation in economic growth. For example, maybe Zaire could not have properly
developed its numerous minerals industries without a substantial supporting investment in
roadbuilding, yielding potential rebels a vital tool for challenging the government. On the
other hand, perhaps Singapore had the opportunity to grow by developing its ports without
risking much destabilization.. These examples are merely meant to be suggestive but they
do seem to point the way to a rich theory of dictatorship and development. A full
integration of our approach with Robinson (1977) remains a serious task for future
research.
Appendix: Solution of Optimal Policy Functions
Optimal policy functions for the dictator and social planner were computed for a broad
range of plausible parameter values. A value of capital of $10 billion was chosen (without
loss of generality) as the approximate value of a typical country’s initial capital. A range
from $0.1 billion to $1 trillion was then chosen as the set of values of capital for which
results would be examined. Possible parameter values were chosen to yield values of
production and other variables that match approximately with available empirical
information, particularly around K  $10 billion. Table 1 shows the values considered.
Every possible combination of these parameters was tried, yielding 432 sets of parameters.
For each set of parameter values, the dynamic programming problem was solved using
a grid of possible values of capital. The grid was constrained to a finite set, which
guarantees convergence for at least the social planner’s optimal value function using
Denardo’s contraction mapping theorem. To ensure that the finite constraints of the grid
had little impact on the results, the constraints were chosen to be two orders of magnitude
below and above the range of results to be examined. The grid used thus ranged from
$0.001 billion to $100 trillion, with 4,001 grid points equally spaced in the logarithm of K
(thus yielding 500 grid steps per order of magnitude in K).
The usual method to converge on an infinite-time-horizon optimal policy is to start by
assuming that for any value of K, society consumes all production in a hypothetical future
period. The computation process then works backward in time, at each step computing for
each value of K the optimal consumption given the discounted future value computed so
far for next period’s K (which is uniquely determined by current K and consumption). The
computation is declared to have converged on an infinite-time-horizon optimal policy when
the change in the contemporaneous value function, between the current and previous time
step, is less than . We used   1.0  105, with the steps equal to 1 year, and required that
the convergence criterion be met for all points in the K-grid before convergence would be
declared. footnote 
For all cases the policy functions as well as the value functions converged. To ensure
adequate convergence, an additional convergence criterion was required to hold before
convergence was declared. For each point in the K-grid, the optimal fraction of output
consumed had to differ by less than  from the value computed at the previous step, and
this requirement had to hold for an additional 50 consecutive steps. The extra steps were
required in case a small change in the value function at one step should induce a large
change in the optimal policy function computed at a next step for some point on the K-grid;
this sensitivity in computation was observed for some parameter values and the 50
additional steps appeared to be more than adequate to handle the sensitivity.
After solving for the optimal policy for a given set of parameters, it was necessary to
carry out further tests. To isolate bifurcation points in economic growth for the dictator, we
started with low and high values of K of $0.1 billion and $1 trillion respectively. The
algorithm used initial working assumptions of negative growth at the bottom of this range
and positive growth at the top of the range, and iterated by testing at the midpoint of the
range to see whether growth was negative or positive. The search continued at each
iteration by testing the midpoint between the highest point so far found to have negative
growth and the lowest point so far found to have positive growth. The search was stopped
when the difference between the values of K considered was less than 0.005. If the search
stopped within 0.005 of the minimum or maximum of the range tried, positive or negative
growth respectively was declared to have occurred throughout the range. In any case a
more intensive search was carried out above and below the apparent bifurcation point (or
above the minimum or below the maximum if positive or negative growth was declared) to
ensure that the growth patterns indeed involve a bifurcation with decline for values of K
below the apparent bifurcation point and growth for values of K above the apparent
bifurcation point (or growth or decline only if no bifurcation point was found). The search
above (below) the point found was carried out by first testing the value of K equal to 1.001
(0.999) times the value of K at the point, then successively increasing the distance away
from the point by 10% per iteration until the full range from $0.1 billion to $1 trillion had
been scrutinized.
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Table 1.  Parameter Grid for Computations
ParameterUsed for Units Values
a Production none 0.3333
q Catastrophe 1/(billion $) ln(.75), ln(.9), ln(.97)*
h Catastrophe none q10ln 1 -q , with 1q  = .05, .15, .3, .5**
d Depreciation 1/years .05, .1
s Utility functionnone 0.5, 1, 1.5
l Appropriation none normalized to 1 (but variations of minU  are
analogous)
minU Utility functionutiles ))10(( 021 == KFaaU , where a1 is a typical
consumption fraction and a2 is a multiplier
to the dictator’s consumption when out of
power relative to when in power; 21aa  =
.001, .01, .05
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year later, the catastrophe probability falls by a multiple of .75 / .9 / .97, i.e. by 25% / 10% / 3%, over that
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Figure 1. Values of K at Which Bifurcation Occurs
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Figure 2. Typical Dictator’s and Planner’s Policy Functions ($billion of
consumption and capital)
Figure 3. Values of K at Which Cut-Through Occurs
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